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Conspiracy theories as barriers to controlling the spread of COVID-19 in the U.S.
Abstract
Rationale: The COVID-19 pandemic poses extraordinary challenges to public health. Objective: Because
the novel coronavirus is highly contagious, the widespread use of preventive measures such as masking,
physical distancing, and eventually vaccination is needed to bring it under control. We hypothesized that
accepting conspiracy theories that were circulating in mainstream and social media early in the COVID-19
pandemic in the US would be negatively related to the uptake of preventive behaviors and also of
vaccination when a vaccine becomes available. Method: A national probability survey of US adults (N =
1050) was conducted in the latter half of March 2020 and a follow-up with 840 of the same individuals in
July 2020. The surveys assessed adoption of preventive measures recommended by public health
authorities, vaccination intentions, conspiracy beliefs, perceptions of threat, belief about the safety of
vaccines, political ideology, and media exposure patterns. Results: Belief in three COVID-19-related
conspiracy theories was highly stable across the two periods and inversely related to the (a) perceived
threat of the pandemic, (b) taking of preventive actions, including wearing a face mask, (c) perceived
safety of vaccination, and (d) intention to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Conspiracy beliefs in March
predicted subsequent mask-wearing and vaccination intentions in July even after controlling for action
taken and intentions in March. Although adopting preventive behaviors was predicted by political ideology
and conservative media reliance, vaccination intentions were less related to political ideology.
Mainstream television news use predicted adopting both preventive actions and vaccination.
Conclusions: Because belief in COVID-related conspiracy theories predicts resistance to both preventive
behaviors and future vaccination for the virus, it will be critical to confront both conspiracy theories and
vaccination misinformation to prevent further spread of the virus in the US. Reducing those barriers will
require continued messaging by public health authorities on mainstream media and in particular on
politically conservative outlets that have supported COVID-related conspiracy theories.
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Rationale: The COVID-19 pandemic poses extraordinary challenges to public health.
Objective: Because the novel coronavirus is highly contagious, the widespread use of preventive measures such as
masking, physical distancing, and eventually vaccination is needed to bring it under control. We hypothesized
that accepting conspiracy theories that were circulating in mainstream and social media early in the COVID-19
pandemic in the US would be negatively related to the uptake of preventive behaviors and also of vaccination
when a vaccine becomes available.
Method: A national probability survey of US adults (N = 1050) was conducted in the latter half of March 2020
and a follow-up with 840 of the same individuals in July 2020. The surveys assessed adoption of preventive
measures recommended by public health authorities, vaccination intentions, conspiracy beliefs, perceptions of
threat, belief about the safety of vaccines, political ideology, and media exposure patterns.
Results: Belief in three COVID-19-related conspiracy theories was highly stable across the two periods and
inversely related to the (a) perceived threat of the pandemic, (b) taking of preventive actions, including wearing
a face mask, (c) perceived safety of vaccination, and (d) intention to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Conspiracy
beliefs in March predicted subsequent mask-wearing and vaccination intentions in July even after controlling for
action taken and intentions in March. Although adopting preventive behaviors was predicted by political ide
ology and conservative media reliance, vaccination intentions were less related to political ideology. Mainstream
television news use predicted adopting both preventive actions and vaccination.
Conclusions: Because belief in COVID-related conspiracy theories predicts resistance to both preventive behaviors
and future vaccination for the virus, it will be critical to confront both conspiracy theories and vaccination
misinformation to prevent further spread of the virus in the US. Reducing those barriers will require continued
messaging by public health authorities on mainstream media and in particular on politically conservative outlets
that have supported COVID-related conspiracy theories.

1. Introduction
Because it is highly contagious, controlling the spread of the novel
coronavirus COVID-19 requires widescale public adoption of preventive
behaviors (Sanche et al., 2020). Understanding the factors that predict
the public’s willingness to engage in them is required to control the
infection. Still, some national leaders have expressed doubt about the
potential seriousness of the pandemic. On March 9th, one member of
Congress ridiculed the idea that drastic measures were needed by
wearing a gas mask to a vote to approve emergency funding for the
pandemic (Cummings, 2020). The President also famously stated that
the pandemic would be less harmful than the seasonal flu (Montanaro,

2020). At the same time, several popular conservative media hosts and
commentators expressed doubts about COVID-19’s seriousness and
lethality (Jamieson and Albarracín, 2020; Motta et al., 2020).
The inconsistency between public health messaging and that
emanating from some prominent media personalities and political
leaders made it difficult for the health community to satisfy a key
precondition of public preventive behavior—communicate a consensus
that such action is needed (World Health Organization, 2008). In earlier
epidemics (Singer et al., 2020), when political leaders of one party failed
to endorse health recommendations to combat the threat, the public
response divided along partisan lines. Similar patterns have unfolded in
the COVID-19 pandemic (Allcott et al., 2020; Pew Research Center,
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2020).
Complicating matters further, belief in conspiracy theories that
attributed a socially significant event, in this case the novel coronavirus,
to unknown and sinister actors (Douglas et al., 2019), were circulating
within social and traditional media (Funke, 2020; Infotagion, 2020; Lee,
2020). Conspiracy beliefs are likely to undermine the motivation to take
action in the current pandemic, in part because they are difficult to rebut
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Uscinski et al., 2016). Also, belief in any one
of them is likely to be associated with belief in others, suggesting that
some persons are more susceptible to such beliefs regardless of their
content (Douglas et al., 2019). In addition, some conspiracy beliefs have
been associated with unsubstantiated fears of vaccination and unwill
ingness to vaccinate (Hornsey et al., 2020; Jolley and Douglas, 2014).
This finding could be especially problematic because vaccinating a high
proportion of those susceptible to the coronavirus is one of the surest
means of controlling it (Greenwood, 2014). If conspiracy beliefs are
associated with mistaken fears about the nature or effects of vaccination,
their circulation could undermine the country’s ability to bring
COVID-19 to heel.

of vaccines (Jolley and Douglas, 2017). The latter path would add to the
challenge of encouraging adoption of this important prevention strat
egy. Thus, we also assessed a common misperception about the safety of
vaccines, and in particular the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR)
vaccine for children (Kata, 2010). We hypothesized that belief in COVID
conspiracies would be positively related to perceptions of the harm of
the MMR vaccine and would partially mediate any inverse relationship
with intention to vaccinate.
Because taking preventive action appeared to have polarized on
partisan grounds, we assessed respondents’ political ideology on the
assumption that it could be related to both conspiracy beliefs and taking
action apart from those beliefs. Building on earlier work (Jamieson and
Albarracín, 2020; Motta et al., 2020; Romano, 2020), we also examined
whether some patterns of media use were associated with acceptance of
COVID-related conspiracies. Consistent with prior research, we expected
that reliance on mainstream television news such as NBC news and the
national print media such as the New York Times would correlate with
higher levels of concern about the pandemic and behaviors to prevent its
spread. At the same time, use of conservative media such as FOX News or
social media was expected to co-vary with holding conspiracy beliefs
(Jamieson and Albarracín, 2020; Motta et al., 2020; Romano, 2020).
Because misinformed beliefs are resistant to correction (Chan et al.,
2017), beliefs in March would be expected to predict changes in pre
ventive intentions and behavior in July.
To address these questions, we employed a path model that
encompassed the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and reported
preventive behaviors and willingness to vaccinate against COVID-19. As
Figs. 1 and 2 show, the model tested the hypothesis that conspiracy
beliefs were inversely related to both, not only directly but indirectly by
way of perceptions of the seriousness of the pandemic to the country and
the respondents themselves. In the case of vaccination (Fig. 2), we
included perceived harms of the MMR vaccine as an additional mediator
of the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and intentions to accept
vaccination. Finally, we tested whether conspiracy beliefs predict
change in either action taken or vaccination intention over the four
months between the two survey waves.
In drawing conclusions about the potential causal role of conspiracy
beliefs, it was important to control for the demographic profile of re
spondents who might be susceptible to conspiracy beliefs. Based on
research showing that people of lower socioeconomic status are more likely
to hold conspiracy beliefs (Douglas et al., 2019; Uscinski and Parent, 2014),
it is possible that persons with less education, income, and from tradi
tionally disadvantaged communities, such as racial and ethnic minorities,
would be more accepting of COVID-related conspiracy beliefs. The model
examined these as predictors of conspiracy beliefs along with other de
mographic differences and controlled for them as potential third-variable
explanations of relations between conspiracy beliefs and our outcomes.

1.1. The current study
As the numbers of deaths from COVID-19 continued to rise, we
conducted two surveys with a panel of US adults, the first in late March
after national recommendations for preventive action were released, but
before mask-wearing was advised, and the second in July after total
statewide lockdowns had been lifted. These surveys were informed by a
prior national survey conducted early in March 2020 (Jamieson and
Albarracín, 2020) that documented belief that: 1) The CDC exaggerated
the danger posed by the virus to hurt President Trump (19% saying
probably or definitely true); 2) the US government created the virus
(10%); and 3) the Chinese government created the virus (23%). Like
ours, that research found that these beliefs were associated with the use
of social media (e.g., Facebook) and conservative media (e.g., Fox News,
Rush Limbaugh, and Breitbart). While that study confirmed that
discernible proportions of the public reported belief in two of these
three, it did not assess whether such beliefs are related to the public’s
willingness to engage in protective action for the pandemic (Jamieson
and Albarracín, 2020). Although other work has suggested that
COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs hindered the adoption of some preventive
behaviors (Barua et al., 2020; Imhoff and Lamberty, 2020), their reli
ance on small cross-sectional convenience samples limits their inter
pretation and generalizability.
Examining conspiracy beliefs within the same sample after a fourmonth interval makes it possible to determine: the stability of such be
liefs; whether those assessed in Wave 1 were negatively associated with
preventive behaviors including intention to vaccinate; and whether the
beliefs were predictive of subsequent recommended action to prevent
the spread of the infection, namely mask-wearing (Howard et al., 2020),
as well as to intentions to vaccinate when a vaccine becomes available.
Based on research indicating the difficulty of correcting conspiratorial
beliefs (Jolley and Douglas, 2017; Uscinski et al., 2016), we expected
that conspiracy beliefs early in the pandemic would not only remain
stable but also would predict subsequent preventive actions and vacci
nation intentions.
Theories of health behavior suggest that threats to the individual and
the community can motivate action (Rogers, 1983; Strecher and
Rosenstock, 1997). Still, conspiracy beliefs tend to downplay the threat
or suggest other means of confronting it. Thus, we hypothesized that
conspiracy beliefs would be inversely related to the perceived threat of
the pandemic and that any inverse relation with taking action or
accepting a vaccine would be mediated by reduced perceptions of threat.
Previous research has linked conspiracy beliefs with vaccination
hesitancy (Hornsey et al., 2020; Jolley and Douglas, 2014). There are at
least two paths that could account for that link. One is through reduced
perception of the threat and the other through concerns about the safety

2. Method
2.1. Survey sample
A national probability-based survey of the US population with 1050
respondents was conducted between March 17 and 27, 2020 (Wave 1).
The sample was recruited by Qualtrics from the NORC AmeriSpeak
Panel (National Opinion Research Center, 2020). To represent the US
population, panel selection was determined in part by the likelihood to
respond across 48 demographic strata. Wave 2 was collected between
July 10 and 21 by inviting the same panel members to take the second
survey. We were able to retain 840 (80%) participants in Wave 2. As
seen in Table 1, the demographic profile in Wave 2 was virtually iden
tical to Wave 1. Additionally, those who dropped out did not differ from
those who remained in any of our dependent variables in Wave 1, except
for a small relation between missingness and intention to vaccinate, r =
− 0.08. As a result, we confined our analyses to those who participated in
both waves.
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Fig. 1. Path model showing standardized relations between predictors in March and outcomes at both time points for taking action. Darker paths have confidence
intervals of p ± .005, while lighter ones are at p ± .025. Dashed paths are indicate inverse relations.

NORC also provided demographic sample weights to enable pro
jections to national responses according to age, gender, race-ethnicity,
education, and Census Division based on the Current Population Sur
vey of February 2020. We used those weights in descriptive summaries
of the sample (see Tables 1 and 3). All multivariate analyses were con
ducted with unweighted data and demographic differences controlled.

options. For this outcome, 79% claimed to wear a mask every day.
Because we did not have a useful measure of this behavior in Wave 1, we
used the measure of the number of actions taken as a proxy for the
willingness to adopt a new preventive behavior. Consistent with this
expectation, the number of actions taken was correlated with maskwearing in Wave 2 (r = 0.23), indicating that it could serve this purpose.
We asked respondents “If there were a vaccine that protected you
from getting the coronavirus, how likely, if at all, would you be to decide
to be vaccinated?” Responses were recorded on a 4-point scale from “Not
at all likely” to “Very likely”. At Wave 1, only 59.6% said they were very
likely to be vaccinated; while 14.5% said they were either not at all or
not too likely to be vaccinated. The corresponding proportion who
claimed they were unlikely to be vaccinated increased to 25.8% at Wave
2, a trend in line with other national surveys (Elflein, 2020; Romano,
2020). Nevertheless, vaccination intentions were positively correlated
over time, r = 0.63.
Perceived threat to the country was measured by asking whether the
pandemic was a more serious threat to the country than (a) illegal
immigration, (b) hurricanes and other natural disasters, or (c) terrorism,
with responses recorded on an agree (1) to disagree scale (6). Since
responses to these items correlated (α = 0.84), we created a national
threat index based on the mean responses to them.
Perceived threat to the individual was measured with an item that
assessed worry that the virus would infect the respondent or someone in
the respondent’s family: “How worried, if at all, do you feel about the
possibility that you or someone in your family will become infected with
the coronavirus?”. Responses ranged from “Not at all worried” to “Very
worried” on a 4-point scale. This item was highly correlated with the

2.2. Survey content
In both waves, we asked whether the respondent had recently taken
any of 9 steps “to protect yourself from getting the coronavirus (COVID19).” The sum of the number reported was used as an index of taking
action to prevent the further spread of COVID-19. As seen in Table 2,
only 1.3% failed to take any action. The most frequent action was
“washed hands or used a hand sanitizer” (92.5%). Although we included
wearing a mask as an option, CDC did not recommend this option until
April 3, after evidence of asymptomatic transmission for COVID-19
emerged (CDC, 2020a) and after we completed the first survey. Also,
testing for the virus was largely unavailable during the period of the
survey. Therefore, we did not include either testing or mask-wearing in
our analysis at time one.
Because various states implemented lockdowns on different dates
during Wave 1, we examined the relation between date of the interview
and our index of taking action. We found no relationship between the
two.
In Wave 2, we also asked whether facial masks had been worn in the
past few days “when you go to public places where you might encounter
other people”, with “never, some days, and every day” as the response
3
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Fig. 2. Path model showing standardized relations between predictors in March and vaccine intentions at both time points. Darker paths have confidence intervals of
p ± .005, while lighter ones are at p ± .025. Dashed paths represent inverse relations.

respondents’ perceived susceptibility to the infection (r = 0.48) and
severity of the illness (r = 0.30), factors that are related to taking pre
ventative action according to health protection theories (Rogers, 1983;
Strecher and Rosenstock, 1997). The percentage who claimed to be very
worried declined slightly from Wave 1 to 2 (24.8–21.1, respectively) and
remained stable at the individual level, r = 0.50.
We assessed belief in three conspiracy theories that either minimized
its importance or blamed it on actors presumed to have malicious intent:
(a) “The pharmaceutical industry created the coronavirus to increase
sales of its drugs and vaccines; ” (b) “The coronavirus was created by the
Chinese government as a biological weapon; ” or (c) “Some in the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, also known as CDC, are
exaggerating the danger posed by the coronavirus to damage the Trump
presidency.” Belief in these statements was registered from “Definitely
false” to “Definitely true” on a 4-point scale. Since beliefs in these con
spiracies were inter-related, we created an index based on the mean of
the items (α = 0.72). The mean (SD) of the index increased slightly from
Wave 1 to 2 (1.75 (0.85) vs. 1.90 (1.08), respectively) and the beliefs
were positively correlated over time, r = 0.75.
We queried belief in the harms of vaccines with the following item:
“How likely do you think it is that vaccines given to children for diseases
like measles, mumps, and rubella can cause neurological disorders like
autism?” Responses were recorded on a 4-point scale ranging from “Not
very likely” to “Very likely.” Consistent with the hypothesis that con
spiracy beliefs regarding the COVID-19 crisis will also underlie a wide
range of health issues, the belief that vaccines are harmful was also
correlated with the conspiracy index, r = 0.48.
We assessed political ideology by asking: “Generally speaking, would
you describe your political views as:” with response options on a 5-point
scale from “very liberal” to “very conservative”. Media use was assessed
to cover the political spectrum, from liberal outlets (e.g., MSNBC and the

Huffington Post), mainstream TV (e.g., ABC, CNN) and mainstream print
(NY Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal), to conservative
media (e.g., Fox News and Rush Limbaugh). Also, we assessed use of
news aggregators (e.g., Google News) and social media (e.g., Facebook).
For each type of media, respondents rated how much information they
got “from such sources as…” on a 5-point scale from “No information”
(0) to “A lot of information” (5). (See Appendix for the wording of these
news items.)
2.3. Analytic strategy
We used the structural equation program Mplus (Muthen and
Muthen, 1998-2017) to model the predicted paths between conspiracy
beliefs and both preventive actions taken and vaccination intention. This
strategy allowed us to test mediation and to separate relations between
conspiracy beliefs and outcomes that were stable over time versus those
that emerged following Wave 1. A power analysis using a Monte Carlo
procedure in Mplus (Muthen and Muthen, 2002) determined that a
sample size of 800 would provide sufficient power to detect a mediated
standardized relation of 0.04 or larger with a 95% confidence interval
(CI). Therefore, we anticipated that a sample size of 1050 would give us
enough power if we achieved the expected 75% participation in Wave 2.
We restricted the analysis to the 840 respondents who participated in
both waves. Approximately 2.6% of the cases had missing data for one or
more items, and these cases were also omitted in the Mplus models.
Standard goodness of fit measures were used to assess model fit (Bollen
and Davis, 2009). We used bootstrapping procedures (with samples of
1000) provided by Mplus to estimate confidence intervals for all pre
dictors in the models. Other analyses were conducted using SPSS version
26.
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Table 1
Demographic characteristics of both waves.
Characteristic

Raw N
Wave 1
(N =
1050)

Gender
Male
486
Female
558
Age
18–29
131
30–44
313
45–59
249
60+
357
Race/Ethnicity
White
807
Black
121
Hispanic
136
Education
High school
216
or less
Some College
625
Post206
Graduate
Income
<$30K
244
$30 to $85
460
$85 to
346
>$200K
Political ideology
Conservative
289
Neither
435
Liberal
304
News Source
Mainstream TV
None
141
Some
472
A lot
423
Mainstream print
None
321
Some
471
A lot
242
Social
None
338
Some
502
A lot
199
Aggregators
None
267
Some
557
A lot
217
Conservative
None
535
Some
334
A lot
166
Liberal
None
447
Some
457
A lot
132

Weighted
% of
Sample
Wave 1

Raw N
Wave
2 (N =
840)

Weighted
% of
Sample
Wave 2

p for
Difference
in Raw Ns

45.6
54.4

401
435

44.3
55.4

.54

20.7
24.1
25.2
30.0

104
245
197
294

20.5
23.9
24.9
30.7

.97

73.0
13.9
14.8

655
96
97

74.2
12.8
15.2

.66

32.6

168

32.6

.78

47.8
19.6

514
157

48.3
30.1

26.4
41.9
31.7

198
357
285

26.8
40.9
32.3

.84

29.6
41.4
28.9

238
340
251

29.6
40.3
30.1

.85

14.0
43.1
41.7

110
378
340

13.4
44.1
42.5

.98

32.8
44.9
20.8

254
380
194

34.0
44.8
21.2

.98

31.5
47.7
19.7

279
404
150

32.6
47.8
19.6

.80

25.1
54.0
19.9

210
447
176

25.2
53.7
21.1

.97

48.9
31.4
18.0

437
262
131

50.6
31.1
18.3

.92

42.9
44.6
11.1

351
372
108

43.2
45.7
11.1

.92

Table 2
Actions taken to protect from getting or spreading infection in March 2020 (N =
840).
Action

%
Reporting

Number of
Actions Taken

% of all Actions
Taken

Washed hands or used a
sanitizer
Kept distance from others
Avoided gatherings >10
people
Stayed at home
Covered nose & mouth
when coughing
Avoided contact with sick
people
Avoided touching face
Wore a face mask
Got tested for the virus
Did nothing

92.9

0

1.3

84.4
82.4

1
2

3.7
3.2

80.5
74.4

3
4

3.8
9.8

69.8

5

16.0

67.2
10.2
0.7
1.3

6
7

23.5
38.8

Note. Number of actions taken is the sum across all 7 included in the index and
the percentage is the distribution of those sums.
Table 3
Percentages of sample believing in conspiracy beliefs by demographic charac
teristics and news use in March 2020 (N = 840).
Characteristic
Gender
Male
Female
Age
18–29
30–44
45–59
60+
Race/Ethnicity
White
Black
Hispanic
Education
High school or less
Some College
Post-Graduate
Income
<$30K
$30 to $85
$85 to >$200K
Political ideology
Conservative
Neither
Liberal
News Source
Mainstream TV
Conservative
Liberal
Aggregators
Social
Mainstream print
Total

Note. Differences in raw distributions were determined using χ2-Square tests.

3. Results

% of Sample

Pharma

CDC

Chinese

44.1
55.6

9.6
19.1

27.0
20.3

29.1
27.8

20.7
23.8
24.5
31.0

26.9
21.9
10.9
4.3

22.7
30.1
25.1
17.1

35.1
29.8
30.3
22.3

74.7
13.9
15.4

9.7
36.3
29.1

22.3
31.4
28.6

25.5
43.8
33.8

32.9
48.2
19.0

27.0
12.1
6.9

31.8
21.7
12.1

42.7
24.0
12.7

26.4
41.1
32.4

27.4
13.7
5.6

27.2
21.5
22.5

37.0
28.5
21.4

29.8
40.0
30.2

11.1
16.4
16.2

40.2
22.6
8.0

37.1
30.6
17.4

41.9
18.1
11.1
20.9
19.6
21.0
100

13.3
13.4
19.6
24.2
19.8
15.0
14.8

15.1
33.5
11.0
25.0
28.6
13.2
23.5

24.7
51.6
21.8
32.2
41.8
18.4
28.3

Note. Pharma = Pharmaceutical industry responsible; CDC = Damages Trump;
Chinese = Created virus. Bolded proportions are for response distributions that
are significantly different (p < .05) either across demographic groups or within
each media use.

Table 3 displays the demographic and media reliance of the sample
and proportions of the weighted sample that reported that each of the
three conspiracy theories was either definitely or probably true. High
proportions reported belief in the conspiracies, ranging from a low of
14.8% for the pharmaceutical industry having created the virus to a high
of 28.3% believing that the Chinese government created the virus as a
bioweapon. Different patterns of media were associated with belief in
the theories. In particular, heavy users of conservative and social media
tended to assign greater credibility to those beliefs. Finally, various
demographic characteristics (age, education, income, and racial-ethnic
identity) were related to conspiracy beliefs.
The path model (Fig. 1) found that action taken in March was related

to conspiracy beliefs both directly and indirectly through perceived
threat to the individual and the nation. The relation between personal
threat and action remained despite the confounding relation with male
identity, which was also negatively related to both. Importantly, con
spiracy beliefs in March predicted action (mask-wearing) in July both
directly [-0.08, 99% CI (− 0.195, − 0.002)] and indirectly through
perceived national threat [-0.24 × 0.22 = − 0.05, 99% CI (− 0.091,
− 0.025)]. Conspiracy beliefs also predicted subsequent mask-wearing
through its relationship with action in March, resulting in a total
5
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relation of − .16, 99% CI (− 0.26, − 0.07). Thus, the relationship between
conspiracy beliefs and action taken in July was more than 5 times
greater than what was attributable to those beliefs in March, going from
− 0.03 to − 0.16. Mask wearing was also predicted by increasing age, use
of mainstream TV, and liberal political ideology, each of which was also
related to components of the model for preventive action in March.
Notably, mainstream TV was negatively related to conspiracy beliefs
and positively to both types of threat.
There also were relations between other kinds of media sources and
components of the model in March (see Table 4). Conservative and so
cial media use were positively related to belief in conspiracy theories,
whereas mainstream print was inversely related to conspiracy beliefs as
were education, income, and White racial identity. Also, mainstream
print and the aggregators were positively related to personal threat. All
of the media relations remained after controlling for demographic dif
ferences, and particularly political ideology, which was strongly corre
lated with the use of conservative media (r = − 0.42) and somewhat less
with liberal media (r = 0.30) and mainstream print (r = 0.33). This
confound was less likely for social media (r = 0.06), use of aggregators
(r = 0.12), and mainstream TV (r = 0.17).
In the case of vaccination (Fig. 2), perceived threat to the respondent
and the nation remained as mediators of the relation between conspiracy
beliefs and vaccine intention in March. However, the belief that the
MMR vaccine is harmful was a strong mediator of the relation between
conspiracy beliefs and vaccine intention and resulted in a somewhat
stronger total relation between conspiracy beliefs and vaccination
intention than for actions taken (− 0.19 vs. − 0.16 in standardized units).
Change in vaccine intention in July was predicted by conspiracy beliefs
both directly, − 0.15, 99% CI (− 0.25, − 0.06), and indirectly as mediated
by MMR harm, − 0.033, 95% CI (− 0.072, − 0.003). The total effect of
conspiracy beliefs on vaccine intentions in July including carry-over
from March was substantial, − 0.29, 99% CI (− 0.37, − 0.22). Thus, the
relationship between conspiracy beliefs and vaccination intention in
July more than doubled from its carryover in March (− .11 to − 0.29).
Reliance on mainstream TV was a positive predictor of vaccination in
July. There was also a positive relation between reliance on social media
and perceptions of MMR harm (Table 4), while education and White
identity were negatively related to harm.
The ability of conspiracy beliefs to predict change in each outcome
was robust to controls for demographic differences and news use. In
each case, the prediction remained despite controls for variables that
were related to both outcomes and conspiracy beliefs (e.g., age, main
stream TV, and ideology). Both models provided good fits to data, with
small values of RMSEA (0.033 and 0.044) and high values of CFI (0.97,
0.96) and TLI (0.94, 0.92). We also tested actions taken by treating it as a
count variable, but again the results remained very much the same.

4. Discussion
Our results show that early in the pandemic in the US, COVID-related
conspiracy beliefs were inversely related to both reporting taking pre
ventive actions and intentions to vaccinate against the disease. In
dividuals younger in age and lower in income and education were more
likely to hold conspiracy beliefs about the origins and seriousness of the
pandemic. Non-white respondents also were more likely to hold such
beliefs. Since the likelihood of dying of COVID-19 increases with age
(CDC, 2020b), the age finding is heartening. Since people of color are
disproportionately dying of it (CDC, 2020c), the finding that they are
more likely to hold conspiracy beliefs is worrisome.
All of these relations are consistent with the suggestion that persons
who feel politically powerless are more susceptible to conspiracy theo
rizing (Crocker et al., 1999; Uscinski and Parent, 2014; Uscinski et al.,
2016). They also are more likely to accept statements from sources that
question the legitimacy of the political system (Hahl et al., 2018; Har
ambam and Aupers, 2015). These conspiratorial beliefs tend to attribute
power to unseen actors who have interests that diverge from those of the
average person. Although some have characterized conspiracy beliefs as
aberrant (see review by Douglas et al., 2019) or reflective of paranoid
thinking styles (Hofstadter, 2008), our findings suggest that they also
are common enough to be problematic.
Our results also show that conspiracy beliefs early in the pandemic
continued to be related to subsequent behavior and intentions four
months later. Mask wearing is increasingly seen as critical to controlling
the spread of the coronavirus (Howard et al., 2020), and those holding
conspiracy beliefs were less likely to engage in it even after health of
ficials recommended it. Additionally, vaccination hesitancy increased
since Wave 1, a finding that matches trends in other national surveys
(Elflein, 2020; Romano, 2020). Here again, we found that the increase in
hesitancy was predicted by earlier endorsement of conspiracy beliefs.
These findings suggest that conspiracy beliefs play a causal role in
reducing the embrace of public health recommendations to control the
pandemic.
The results also suggest that perceptions of the seriousness of the
pandemic mediated the relation between conspiracy beliefs and maskwearing, while perceptions of personal threat were only directly
related to each outcome in Wave 1. It is also noteworthy that reliance on
mainstream TV news was a positive predictor of change in both out
comes, as well as negatively related to conspiracy beliefs and positively
to both types of threat in March. These patterns suggest that mainstream
TV news plays a larger role than other news media in emphasizing the
importance of the pandemic’s threat and in not legitimizing COVIDrelated conspiracy theories.
In distinction to the role played by mainstream TV news, reliance on
conservative media was positively related to endorsing conspiracies and
negatively related to perceptions of the national threat. This finding
comports with the inverse relation we observed between liberal political
ideology and COVID-related conspiracy beliefs. Use of liberal media was
also positively related to seeing the pandemic as a national threat,
consistent with national polls showing partisan differences in support
for actions to prevent the spread of the infection (Allcott et al., 2020;
Pew Research Center, 2020). It is perhaps fortunate that partisan dif
ferences were less related to vaccination intentions than to taking action
at either point. Neither political ideology nor conservative media reli
ance was directly related to perceptions of MMR harm or vaccine in
tentions. Nevertheless, these patterns suggest that the partisan cueing
that has been apparent in the government and conservative media may
be affecting the public’s response to the pandemic, as they have in
previous health threats (Singer et al., 2020).
The proportions who agree that the novel coronavirus was created by
the Chinese government as a bioweapon or that some in the CDC are
exaggerating the seriousness of the virus to undermine the Trump
presidency are higher in this study than those reported by Jamieson and
Albarracín (23% vs. 28% for China and 19% vs. 23% for CDC). A likely

Table 4
Standardized predictors of conspiracy beliefs, pandemic threats, and vaccine
harm in March 2020.
News Source
& Demographic
Predictors

Conspiracy
Beliefs

National Threat

Personal
Threat

Vaccine
Harm

Liberal
Conservative
Aggregators
Social
Mainstream Print
Education
Income
White Racial Identity
Liberal Ideology

–
.22
–
.08
-.14
-.17
-.06*
-.13
-.19

.13
-.10
–
–
–
–
–
–
.14

–
–
.07
–
.09
–
–
–
.11

–
–
.09*
.07*
–
-.09
–
-.08*
–

Note. Vaccine harm was tested in a separate model from action taken. All co
efficients have confidence intervals of p ± .005 except for those at p ± .025
marked by *.
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reason is that, unlike ours, their respondents were given the option of
saying they were “not sure” of the answer. Since it is unlikely that belief
changed dramatically in the few weeks between their early March and
our late March survey, the difference in response options probably ex
plains the increased acceptance of the same conspiracy beliefs that we
found. The higher proportions that reported acceptance here suggest
that those who are unsure are more inclined to believe than not. Our
proportions are also in line with those observed by Uscinski et al. (2020)
who also did not allow a not-sure response, and the findings of Oliver
and Wood (2014) who surveyed other conspiracy theories related to
health outcomes. Nevertheless, identifying those who are unsure may be
important because persuasion is more likely among those who have not
yet made a firm commitment to a belief.
The negative relation between conspiracy beliefs and taking pre
ventive actions required to control the spread of COVID-19 poses chal
lenges for public health. Persons holding conspiracy beliefs are likely to
resist actions recommended by public health agents, such as the CDC
(Nyhan and Reifler, 2015). They also are likely to turn down an eventual
vaccine. The challenge for public health officials is compounded by the
finding that anti-vaccine social media networks are highly inter
connected and likely to influence others more so than are
pro-vaccination networks, which are more peripheral and less connected
with other networks (Johnson et al., 2020). Our findings regarding so
cial media as a source of information related to conspiracy beliefs add to
this concern.
Although personal perceptions of threat mediated taking preventive
action for both outcomes, conspiracy beliefs were more closely related to
vaccination hesitancy through perceived MMR harms. Displacing worry
about the harms of vaccination should be a goal of those encouraging the
uptake of an eventual vaccine for the coronavirus.
Prior research suggests that efforts to reduce conspiracy beliefs with
information face significant obstacles, a phenomenon that may be
related to their non-falsifiability (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Uscinski,
2017) and believers’ underlying distrust of elites who provide corrective
information. Another reason for the robustness of conspiracy theories is
the tolerance that those who hold them have for inconsistency (Douglas
et al., 2019; Miller, 2020; Wood et al., 2012). For example, believing
that the Chinese government created the virus is inconsistent with
believing that the pharmaceutical industry was the originator. This
pattern suggests that the relation between these beliefs is more of an “or”
than an “and” one so that disputing one does not affect any other (Miller,
2020). What underlies beliefs in the conspiracy theory space is an un
derlying distrust of those in power (Crocker et al., 1999; Uscinski and
Parent, 2014; Uscinski et al., 2016).
Our analyses of media sources, as well as those of others (Motta et al.,
2020; Romano, 2020), suggest that conservative outlets which tend to
support the President and social media that do not control the content on
their sites (Gregory and McDonald, 2020) have been purveyors of con
spiracy theories. Although Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram all began
blocking COVID misinformation before our first survey (see Jamieson
and Albarracín, 2020), we saw a slight increase in the level of conspiracy
belief within our panelists between March and July.
This study also exposes the cost of failing to interdict misinformed
beliefs at their outset. Had the misbelief that the MMR vaccine can cause
autism been dispatched when it emerged in 1998 (Eggertson, 2010), it
would not be affecting the willingness to take the COVID-19 vaccine
now. For this reason and because belief in the three conspiracy theories
on which we focused here predicts resistance to both preventive be
haviors and COVID-19 vaccination, it will be critical for the public
health community to increase its messaging in mainstream media and, in
particular, in conservative media outlets. State-of-the-science methods
should be deployed to debunk or displace the conspiracy theories and
vaccine fears identified here (see Lewandowsky et al., 2012).

4.1. Limitations
Our study has limitations. New conspiracies have emerged since we
began this study; but as observed by Miller (2020), even those are highly
related to the ones we assessed. At the same time, greater direct expe
rience with the effects of the disease on friends and family may have
made the threat of the pandemic to the country more real, something we
did not reassess in July. Our measures of media use may be difficult to
separate from personality differences, but we controlled for political
ideology in all our analyses and the most robust predictor of change in
outcomes, mainstream TV use, was not highly related to ideology. Our
sample of 840 respondents may limit our ability to generalize to the
entire US population. However, many of the patterns we observed in
regard to conspiracy beliefs, media use, political ideology and vaccine
acceptance were consistent with other national polls. Finally, our use of
an online panel may also have reduced the representativeness of the
sample, but our findings regarding the prevalence of conspiracy beliefs
and their relation with media use were consistent with an earlier survey
that was conducted by telephone (Jamieson and Albarracín, 2020).
5. Conclusions
Conspiracy beliefs regarding the coronavirus pandemic in the US
were widespread and persistent over four months, more likely to be held
by either persons with conservative political ideology or in disadvan
taged racial-ethnic groups and more likely to be associated with use of
conservative media outlets. Additionally, persons with non-White racialethnic identity and those using social media were more likely to believe
that the MMR vaccine is harmful. Conspiracy beliefs and their associa
tions with perceptions of vaccine harm present continuing challenges to
the control of the coronavirus pandemic because of their persistence and
association with non-acceptance of recommended action, especially
mask-wearing, and increasing unwillingness to receive a vaccine when it
becomes available. Confronting these conspiracy beliefs will require
action by journalists and commentators, especially those with politically
conservative audiences, to increase acceptance of medically recom
mended actions to control the pandemic.
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Appendix
Media Battery (Rated on a 5-point scale ranging from No information to A
lot of information)
How much information do you get from sources such as Fox News,
Rush Limbaugh, Breitbart News, One America News or The Drudge
Report?
How much information do you get from sources such as MSNBC, Bill
Maher or the Huffington Post?
How much information do you get from sources such as ABC News,
CBS News or NBC News?
How much information do you get from sources such as Google News
or Yahoo News?
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How much information do you get from sources such as Facebook,
Twitter or YouTube?
How much information do you get from sources such as the Associ
ated Press, The New York Times, the Washington Post, or the Wall Street
Journal?
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